China’s Emissions Targets: a (Non)Reductionist Approach

The past week of events – from a U.S. Senate hearing, to remarks by China’s State Council, to high-level talks in Beijing – have scattered a layer of rich soil from which robust US-China cooperation on climate change might spring forth.

However, that soil is not uniform in content. The issue of quantifiable emissions reductions, central to continued bilateral discussions leading up to Copenhagen, is anything but homogeneously understood, as recent events demonstrate.

Senate Hearing on U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change

On the heels of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry’s visit to Beijing, which culminated in a vague-but-hopeful China-U.S. Clean Energy Initiatives Agreement, Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing in Washington on that topic.

Throughout the hearing, panelists stressed the importance of emissions reductions that are “measurable, reportable, and verifiable." 

However, Kerry and at least one panelist differed in their perspectives on China’s capacity to deliver such reductions.

Kerry heaped praise upon Chinese energy initiatives, saying:

“The Chinese are beginning to realize that addressing climate change and pursuing sustainable energy policies is very much in their own national interest” and “I believe … we are going to see very significant reductions from China.”

Council on Foreign Relations scholar Elizabeth Economy appeared less convinced.

Identifying the road to those measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) reductions as “a long term process” and highlighting  institutional limitations, Economy guessed that, with regard to achieving quantifiable emissions reductions commitment, “the best” the U.S. should expect is “a framework for an agreement moving forward on MRV.”

State Council Meeting

Next, a June 6 report from China Daily, China’s state-owned news outlet, referenced remarks made at a meeting of the State Council, China’s highest executive body. Journalist Fu Jing wrote:

“China will put in place carbon dioxide emissions targets for its economic and social development programs” and “may be considering national goals for carbon dioxide levels when it maps its 12th five-year national development plan.”  

Though absent specific targets, the comment was significant. The five-year plan is China’s primary strategy for social and economic development and the dominant metric by which governance is measured. The 12th five-year plan will cover the years 2011-2015.

However, Director of the National Resource Defense Council’s China Environmental Law Project Alex Wang quickly suggested that something critical had been lost in translation.

Whereas the phrases “carbon dioxide emissions targets” and “national goals for carbon dioxide levels” used by the English-language China Daily suggest a possibility for baseline emissions reductions in China, the Chinese-language press announcement explicitly identified only “carbon dioxide intensity” (paifang qiangdu) as the target under consideration. 

Carbon intensity refers to the amount of emissions per unit of GDP. As we’ve pointed out before, reductions in carbon intensity would not a priori amount to reduced emissions. So long as China’s GDP grows, so, too, would emissions.

The clarification Wang makes is vital, as it demonstrates that China still does not intend to commit to emissions reductions.

In fact, speaking Thursday before reporters, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang definitively stated China will not accept binding cuts in its greenhouse gas emissions, adding: